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The Mixed Motive Instruction in Employment  
Discrimination Cases: What Employers Need to Know
In cases of defense ’tis best to weigh 
The enemy more mighty than he seems.
—William shakesPeare (1564–1616), henRy v, act ii, scene 4 
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the Mixed Motive instruction in employment  
Discrimination cases: What employers Need to Know
Abstract: In litigation regarding employment discrimination, 
the burden of establishing proof has continued to shift. As a 
result, employers and legal counsel need to be aware of the 
status of what they and human resources professionals should 
consider when an employee alleges that the employer has vio-
lated federal discrimination statutes. The original standard of 
proof required the plaintiff to establish that the employer dis-
criminated against that person. Many cases still involve that 
approach, giving the plaintiff the burden of creating a prima 
facie case. However, another line of rulings by the U.S. 
Supreme Court added an alternative method for addressing 
discrimination litigation, known as the 
mixed motive approach. The two-prong 
mixed motive case requires the employee 
to demonstrate that a protected character-
istic (e.g., race, sex, national origin) was a 
substantial factor in an employer’s adverse 
action. If that is established, the employer 
then has the burden of proving that the de-
cision would have been made in any event, 
regardless of the employee’s protected char-
acteristic. As a practical matter, employers 
facing litigation of this type must consider 
whether and how to defend such a case. 
Even a “win” can be expensive, because in 
cases where there is a divided decision, the employer must 
pay the plaintiff ’s attorney fees and court costs, as well as its 
own. Moreover, since the Civil Rights Act of 1991 places 
discrimination cases in front of a jury, a divided decision is 
seemingly more likely. Although that presumably gives both 
sides a win, it still means a large expense for the employer.
The burden of proof in discrimination cases has been the 
subject of at least eight Supreme Court cases, hundreds 
of lower courts cases, and thousands of law review pages. 
Some might consider the time spent on this topic to be a 
prime example of a situation in which the Supreme Court, 
numerous lower court judges, lawyers, and academics 
are focusing too much energy on a relatively meaningless 
question. The issue is not meaningless to those who have 
found themselves the target of litigation, however. For 
those parties, the way that courts assign the burden of 
proof may, in fact, determine the probability of a damage 
award and the amounts of the damages awarded. Thus, 
a change in the allocation of the burden of proof can af-
fect the number of cases filed, the amount of settlements 
agreed upon, and the fate of thousands of cases. 
In contrast to the view that burden of proof is immate-
rial, we note the holding in Desert Palace d/b/a Caesars 
Palace Hotel & Casino v. Costa. In this 
opinion, the United States Supreme 
Court set a new standard for determin-
ing whether plaintiffs can get a “mixed 
motive” jury instruction in discrimina-
tion cases.1 This case represents a major 
shift in the balance of power in discrimi-
nation lawsuits. In fact, as we explain 
below, it is possible that Costa’s effect 
will be so great that employers should 
rarely go to trial in discrimination cases 
because the cost of losing will be so high 
and the odds of winning so low. Know-
ing this, plaintiffs’ lawyers will be apt to 
take increasingly marginal cases and will demand higher 
settlements. If our analysis is correct, Costa will have 
fundamentally changed the face of discrimination cases 
by transforming marginal cases into huge liabilities for 
employers. 
In this report we analyze the effect of the shifting 
burden of proof, particularly in the wake of Costa. Un-
fortunately, as we explain below, neither an analysis of 
published legal opinions nor any other traditional method 
of legal research will answer the question. Because the 
precedent in Costa is relatively recent, a survey of lawyers 
is unlikely to answer this question with any certainty. 
Thus, to analyze the effect of Costa, we have developed our 
A change in the  
allocation of  
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own data from a test sample. In addition to a discussion 
of the cases leading up to the Costa holding, this Center 
Report presents the results of a study that we conducted 
to determine the effect of Costa on the outcome of dis-
crimination cases. Our discussion of Costa begins with an 
examination of burden of proof, describes the two differ-
ent methods of proof in discrimination cases, clarifies how 
these two methods of proof have developed, and sets forth 
the employer’s options in discrimination cases. 
Understanding the Burden of Proof
To understand the two different methods for proving 
discrimination, it is necessary to explain how burdens of 
proof work. When a case reaches the trial stage, one party 
bears the burden of proof, and therefore must convince the 
factfinder that its position is correct. In contrast, the other 
side need not prove anything. As a result, the primary task 
of the party without the burden is to prevent the other 
side from proving its argument. To better understand the 
concept of burden of proof, imagine a football field. The 
job of the offense is to score and the defense’s job is to pre-
vent the offense from scoring. In a legal context, the side 
with the burden of proof is the offense, with the other side 
being the defense. While it would be nice for the defense 
to score, it does not have to. Similarly, while it would be 
nice for the litigant without the burden of proof to prove 
its case, it does not have to. It simply must prevent the 
other side from meeting its burden. 
Depending on the type of litigation, the party with the 
burden of proof will face one of three standards of proof. 
Those are (1) preponderance of the evidence, (2) clear and 
convincing evidence, and (3) beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Continuing the football analogy, to satisfy the prepon-
derance standard, the “offense” must get the ball past the 
fifty-yard line into the other team’s territory. The clear and 
convincing standard requires the ball to fall within easy 
field-goal range near the goal line. Last, establishing a case 
beyond a reasonable doubt is comparable to a touchdown, 
in that the factfinder must be almost certain of the facts 
being adduced. 
An effective way to explain the operation of the burden 
is to look at one of more famous criminal cases of the 20th 
century: People of California v. O. J. Simpson. In Simpson, 
as in all criminal cases, the prosecution carried the burden 
of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Simpson was 
guilty of murder. The defense, on the other hand, was not 
required to prove anything. For instance, Simpson needed 
neither to prove that he did not kill the victims nor did 
he need to prove that someone else did. Rather, Simpson 
simply had to prevent the prosecution from successfully 
proving its case by attacking the prosecution’s assertions. 
For example, the prosecution presented blood from the 
crime scene, claiming it belonged to Simpson. Instead 
of proving that the blood did not match his, however, 
Simpson merely presented evidence to show that the chain 
of custody was broken, and therefore the evidence was 
unreliable. When the prosecution presented bloody gloves, 
Simpson discredited this evidence by demonstrating that 
the gloves did not fit him. Again, Simpson only needed to 
attack the prosecution’s evidence; he never had to prove 
his innocence.2
Why a case’s Outcome  
May Depend on Burden of Proof
There are two methods for proving intentional employ-
ment discrimination: (1) the McDonnell Douglas method; 
and (2) the “mixed motive” method. Based on the circum-
stances of the case, the judge determines whether to clas-
sify a matter as being a “mixed motive” case. 
McDonnell Douglas: Burdening the Plaintiff 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court 
set forth a standard of proving discrimination in which 
the burden of proof remained with the plaintiff at all 
times.3 Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, plaintiffs 
must first prove a “prima facie case” by showing that they:  
(1) are members of a protected class; (2) were minimally 
qualified and either applied for or held the job; (3) suf-
fered an adverse employment action; and (4) either the job 
remained open, was filled by someone outside the class, 
or similarly situated employees outside the protected class 
engaged in similar conduct and did not suffer the same 
adverse action. Plaintiffs that prove these four elements, 
which typically are not difficult to establish, create a 
presumption of discrimination. The defendant must then 
rebut this presumption.
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
the Supreme Court “clarified” how employers may rebut 
the presumption created when the plaintiff proves a prima 
facie case.4 Burdine held that the employer does not have 
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to prove that it hired the best applicant or that it did not 
discriminate. Instead, the employer only has the burden of 
“articulating” a non-discriminatory reason for the employ-
ment decision. This requirement is not, however, a burden 
of proof. Instead, the employer’s burden is merely one of 
production. The employer must set forth the reason for 
its decision, but need not prove that the reason given is 
true. If the employer indeed satisfies its burden of produc-
tion, the employee, according to Burdine, could then take 
further steps to prove discrimination in one of two ways. 
First, the plaintiff can prevail by demonstrating that the 
real reason for the decision was discrimination (notwith-
standing the reason given by the employer). Alternatively, 
the plaintiff could prevail by proving that the reason 
articulated by the employer was pretext 
(unworthy of belief ). In either situation, 
the plaintiff, according Burdine, would 
prevail as a matter of law.
Mixed Motive:   
the Burden Begins to shift
Seven years after Burdine, in Price-Water-
house v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court de-
veloped a second method for proving in-
tentional discrimination.5 This method is 
referred to as the “mixed motive” method. 
In Hopkins, the plaintiff alleged she was 
denied partnership at Price-Waterhouse 
because she was a woman. To prove her 
case, the plaintiff presented evidence that partners made 
a number of discriminatory comments to her, including 
statements that she:  (1) “was too masculine”; (2) “should 
wear more make-up”; and (3) “should go to charm school.” 
The Court held that basing employment decisions on a 
failure to live up to a sexual stereotype constituted dis-
crimination. Accordingly, the plaintiff would prevail if the 
employer relied on these discriminatory reasons for deny-
ing Hopkins partnership. The employer did not deny the 
alleged discriminatory reasons, but presented additional 
reasons for the decision not to promote the plaintiff. For 
example, the employer presented evidence that the plaintiff 
was disliked by staff members and had difficulty getting 
along with colleagues. In addition, the employer argued 
that it previously denied partnership to male employees 
with deficiencies similar to those of the plaintiff.
The Hopkins Court was presented with a peculiar 
set of circumstances. Because there were both legitimate 
and illegitimate reasons for the employer’s decision, the 
Court held that the McDonnell-Douglas method was not 
appropriate for resolving the case. In a hotly contested 
split decision, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, 
which most courts accept as the case’s holding, set forth a 
new standard of proof for so-called “mixed motive” cases. 
Under O’Connor’s opinion, the mixed motive standard 
of proof requires an employee to prove by “direct evi-
dence” that the protected characteristic, such as sex, was 
a substantial factor in the employer’s decision-making 
process. If the employee fails to meet this burden, the case 
is over. If, however, the employee satisfies the substantial 
factor test, the burden of proof shifts to 
the employer, which now has to prove 
(rather than merely assert) that it would 
have made the same decision regardless 
of the employee’s protected characteris-
tic. An employer who meets this burden 
avoids liability and precludes the plaintiff 
from receiving an award. Conversely, if 
the employer fails to prove it would have 
made the same decision regardless of the 
protected characteristic, the plaintiff re-
ceives back pay, reinstatement, attorney’s 
fees, and litigation costs. 
O’Connor’s opinion emphasized 
that the mixed motive instruction was 
only available when the employee had direct evidence 
of discrimination. Examples of direct evidence include 
statements, documents, or other tangible examples of dis-
crimination. Alternatively, circumstantial evidence, which 
consists of facts put together to create an inference of 
discrimination, did not entitle a plaintiff to a mixed motive 
method of proof. 
How Hicks confused Matters
With its shifting burdens of proof, Hopkins created a 
model that was easy to follow. Employees with direct 
evidence of discrimination could argue their case was a 
“mixed motive” case and shift the burden of proof onto 
the employer. On the other hand, if there was no direct 
evidence of discrimination, plaintiffs would be required to 
prevail under the McDonnell Douglas formula. This “nice 
The mixed  
motive instruction 
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and neat” model lost some of its appeal after the Supreme 
Court decided St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.6
In Hicks, the plaintiff proved that the employer’s stated 
reason for terminating the employee was a pretext. The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that prov-
ing pretext entitled the plaintiff to a judgment as a matter 
of law. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Eighth 
Circuit and held that while factfinders may infer discrimi-
nation from a finding of pretext, plaintiffs are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law only if they prove both that an 
employer’s articulated reason was a pretext and also that 
the real reason for the decision was discrimination. Com-
mentators refer to this standard as “pretext plus evidence,” 
or, more simply, “pretext plus.” Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ 
advocates were outraged by this holding, 
while those representing management 
were delighted by the decisions.7 
Although a discussion of the mer-
its of Hicks is beyond the scope of this 
report, its effect on discrimination litiga-
tion is profound and must be addressed. 
Before Hicks, the two different burdens 
of proof created a simple coherent model. 
Employees with no direct evidence of 
discrimination used the McDonnell 
Douglas formula and employees with 
direct evidence asked the court to consider the case to be 
mixed motive. After Hicks, cases without evidence were 
considered “orphan” cases.8 Plaintiffs’ lawyers did not want 
to invest years of time and money into a case that required 
a factfinder to infer discrimination. Instead, it made more 
sense to take on only those cases with actual evidence.9  
If there was direct evidence, plaintiffs’ lawyers would 
contend that they were entitled to a mixed motive instruc-
tion. Still, a model did survive: direct evidence involved 
St. Mary’s v. Hicks, while circumstantial evidence invoked 
McDonnell Douglas.
civil rights Act of 1991: More complications 
While the formulas of proof were important, their real 
effect was limited for the following two reasons. First, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) did not 
permit jury trials.10 Second, under Hopkins employers 
could prevail in mixed motive cases by proving they would 
have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiff ’s 
being part of a protected class. Accordingly, even though 
the mixed motive method redirected the burden of proof, 
employers could still prevail if they were able to convince 
the judge that they had not discriminated. The passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 drastically changed the 
mixed motive landscape by: (1) allowing jury trials in Title 
VII cases,11 and (2) changing the standards and damage 
scheme for mixed motive cases. 
Before jury trials were permitted in Title VII cases, 
judges were the factfinders in cases relating to discrimina-
tion by race, sex, color, religion, and national origin. In 
many of these cases, the plaintiffs’ lawyers would argue that 
the case was a mixed motive case and the employer would 
argue it was not. A judge who was unsure whether the case 
warranted applying the mixed motive 
method could appease the plaintiff and 
prevent a successful appeal by labeling the 
case “mixed motive” but then holding that 
the employer satisfied its burden. 
charging the jury
After the CRA of 1991, however, the 
question of whether a case warranted ap-
plication of the mixed motive method had 
a profound effect on the matter of who 
would be the factfinder. From that point 
on, the judge’s decision regarding whether the case is to be 
decided according to the McDonnell Douglas rules or the 
mixed motive approach manifests itself in instructions to a 
jury. A judge who labels a case as being a mixed motive case 
must instruct the jury that the employer must prove that it 
did not discriminate. Because of the difficulty of proving a 
negative, whether the judge instructs the jury with a mixed 
motive standard rather than a McDonnell Douglas standard 
may determine the result of the case. Placing the burden of 
proof on employers leads one to believe that employers will 
find it difficult—perhaps impossible—to prevail in mixed 
motive cases, especially given the perception that juries 
favor employees over employers.12
To make matters worse for employers, the CRA of 
1991 made the mixed motive instruction more “plaintiff 
friendly” in the following two essential ways. First, the 
statute made it easier for a plaintiff to obtain the judge’s 
determination that the case involved a mixed motive. 
Under CRA of 1991 plaintiffs no longer have to prove 
The passage of the 
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that the protected characteristic was a substantial factor in 
the employer’s decision. Instead, the new standard is that 
the protected characteristic be a “motivating factor” in the 
employment decision, which is an easier test to satisfy.
Second, the act changed the damage scheme to the 
point where litigating these cases becomes foolish for em-
ployers. We make this conclusion because judges can now 
award attorney fees, litigation costs, and declaratory judg-
ments to plaintiffs who met the “motivating factor” stan-
dard, even where the employer meets its burden of proving 
that the decision would have been made anyway. Thus, 
employers who successfully prove that the business decision 
would have been made regardless of discrimination are still 
subject to huge expenses and damages.
The effect of awarding costs and fees 
is profound because they are the major 
damage component of most discrimina-
tion cases. In large cities like New York 
and Chicago, management lawyers report 
that their fees for a discrimination case 
will almost always exceed $150,000 and 
have often been well over $500,000.13 
While plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees awards are 
almost always less than management’s 
fees, they are still considerable. After the 
CRA of 1991, mixed motive cases became 
costly because employers who “won” still might have to pay 
their attorneys’ fees and often the plaintiff ’s fees. Accord-
ingly, it could easily cost an employer over $500,000 to 
“win” a mixed motive case. This figure does not include out-
of-pocket litigation expenses for each side, lost employee 
and management time, and the bad publicity that accompa-
nies both the trial and subsequent judgment of discrimina-
tion. As a result, after 1991 employers were well advised 
to settle mixed motive cases, because the costs of “winning” 
would almost always greatly exceed the settlement demand. 
The solace for employers was that mixed motive  
instructions were relatively unusual. The majority of  
jurisdictions held that a mixed motive instruction would 
only be given in cases with direct evidence of discrimina-
tion, which is hard to come by. Indeed, decision makers 
rarely make discriminatory remarks in writing or in front 
of employees who might testify against the company. 
Thus, the mixed motive instruction was unavailable in the 
most discrimination cases.
How Costa redefined the Landscape
Returning to the case originally known as Costa v. Desert 
Palace, the Ninth Circuit diverged from other circuits 
by holding that either direct or circumstantial evidence 
was sufficient to warrant a mixed motive instruction. To 
resolve the split among the circuits, the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case, issuing its decision in 2003,  
as Desert Palace d/b/a Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino  
v. Costa.14 The issue in Costa was whether direct evidence 
of discrimination was required for a plaintiff to receive 
a mixed motive instruction or whether circumstantial 
evidence would suffice. 
In arguing for direct evidence, the employer in Costa 
contended that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Hopkins, which required direct evidence, 
was the holding of the case and still the 
law. The plaintiff, on the other hand, 
argued the CRA of 1991’s language was 
clear and did not require any specific type 
of evidence. Rather, it merely stated that 
the plaintiff had to prove that discrimina-
tion motivated the employer. 
In a unanimous decision, the Court 
held that the CRA of 1991’s language 
was unambiguous and did not require di-
rect evidence. Thus, any type of evidence 
of discrimination may enable a plaintiff to receive a mixed 
motive instruction. This decision could change the face of 
discrimination law because a plaintiff with any evidence 
of discrimination can now receive a mixed motive jury 
instruction, which, as we said above, may be tantamount 
to winning the case.
the Mixed Motive instruction  
versus the Pretext instruction
To clarify this distinction, let’s compare a sample mixed 
motive instruction with a typical pretext instruction. 
Each court may fashion its own specific jury instructions, 
as long as they are in accordance with settled law. Some 
jurisdictions, however, established model jury instructions 
that are used in the most cases. These instructions are 
accompanied by what are referred to as “special jury verdict 
sheets.” With that caveat, the pages to follow give sample 
instructions from the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit and sample special verdict sheets.
After 1991  
employers were 
well advised to 
settle mixed  
motive cases.
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The difference between the two instructions may seem 
minimal and meaningless, but the difference is large when 
one considers the contention made several years ago by 
film director Spike Lee, who stated that race motivates 
a part of every decision. Regardless of whether Lee was 
correct, it is possible that a substantial number of poten-
tial jurors agree with him. It is also possible that there 
are those who feel the same way about sex, color, national 
origin, religion, age, and disability. Lee’s contention is im-
portant because anyone who subscribes to this theory will 
find that virtually any plaintiff in a discrimination case has 
satisfied the initial burden in the mixed motive scheme. 
The problem with that observation, however, is that after 
the CRA of 1991, the employee would receive costs and 
attorney fees based on nothing more than that determina-
tion, even if the jury then decided that the employer’s  
decision would have been the same if race or other pro-
tected classes were not involved. This situation infuriates 
management lawyers. Jurors do not know that their belief 
that discriminatory factors always motivate decisions 
means that they will unwittingly award the plaintiff costs 
and fees, regardless of the employer’s intentions.
A Comparison of Jury Instructions in a Failure- 
to-promote Case Based on National Origin
	 “Pretext”	InstructIon:
Plaintiff bases his lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, a law that makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against an employee on the basis of national 
origin. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he was denied a 
promotion by Defendant because of his national origin.* To 
determine that Plaintiff was denied a promotion because of 
his national origin, you must decide that Defendant would 
have promoted Plaintiff had he not been of his particular 
national origin but everything else was the same. 
If you find that Plaintiff has proved by a  
preponderance of the evidence each of the things required 
of him, then you must find for Plaintiff. However, if you 
find that Plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence each of the things required of him, then you must 
find for Defendant. 
 “MIxed	MotIve”	InstructIon:
Plaintiff bases his lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, a law that makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against an employee on the basis of national 
origin. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his national origin was 
a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision not to offer him 
a promotion. A motivating factor is something that contrib-
uted to Defendant’s decision. 
If you find that Plaintiff has proved that his national 
origin contributed to Defendant’s decision not to offer him 
a promotion, you must then decide whether Defendant 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would 
have not offered him a promotion even if Plaintiff was 
not of his particular national origin. If you find that the 
Defendant has proven that it would not have offered him a 
promotion even in the absence of discrimination, you must 
still enter a verdict for the Plaintiff but you may not award 
him damages. 
sPecIal	verdIct	sheets
Pretext Cases:  
1. Did plaintiff establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that defendant discriminated against him in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis of his 
national origin with respect to the decision not to offer him 
a promotion in December 2003?
Yes ____ No ____
If you answered “no” to Question 1, sign the special 
verdict form on the last page. If you answered “yes” to Ques-
tion 1, plaintiff is entitled to recover back pay damages. The 
parties have stipulated that the total amount of back pay to 
be awarded to plaintiff is $50,000. Check the box below to 
signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of $50,000 
and then sign the special verdict form. 
Mixed Motive Cases:
1. Did plaintiff establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that his national origin was a motivating factor in the deci-
sion by defendant not to offer him a promotion in Decem-
ber 2003? 
Yes ____ No ____
You should answer the next question only if you 
answered “yes” to Question 1. If you answered Question 1 
“no,” you should not answer any further questions but sign 
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this special verdict form on the last page and return the 
form to the clerk. 
2. Did defendant establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant would have treated plaintiff the same 
way even if the plaintiff’s national origin had not played any 
role in the employment decision? 
Yes ____ No ____ 
If you answered “yes” to Question 2, sign the special 
verdict form on the last page. If you answered “no” to Ques-
tion 2, plaintiff is entitled to recover back pay damages. The 
parties have stipulated that the total amount of back pay to 
be awarded to plaintiff is $50,000. Check the box below to 
signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of $50,000 
and then sign the special verdict form. 
* Our example involves national origin, but it could be any of  the other six   
   protected classes: namely, sex, race color, religion, age, or disability.
One “Management Lawyer’s”  
Method for Avoiding the Unintended fees
Considering this two-part test, coauthor Joe Baumgarten, 
of the law firm of Proskauer, Rose, raised another con-
cern. He hypothesized that to suit their sense of “fair play,” 
juries that are presented with a two-prong decision would 
“split the baby,” as follows. They first would hold that the 
protected class motivated the employer. Then they would 
determine that the employer would have made the same 
decision regardless of the protected class. Once again, such 
a jury would have no idea that it had just awarded costs 
and fees to the plaintiff. Baumgarten sought to eliminate 
this problem by taking the issues in stepwise fashion. Rath-
er than offer both prongs of the mixed motive instruction, 
Baumgarten suggests simply having the jury determine 
whether the protected class motivated the employer’s deci-
sion. He argues that a jury might be less inclined to find 
such motivation if that is the only question asked and if 
they knew that the finding of “yes” meant that the employer 
had to pay damages. Because the second prong involves an 
employer’s defense, the employer can determine in advance 
whether to present it. Thus, Baumgarten proposed a third 
set of instructions and special jury verdict sheet. In this 
instruction he eliminated the second prong of the mixed 
motive instruction and the second question on the special 
verdict sheet. Thus, the instruction and the verdict sheet 
would appear as shown at upper right.
Alternative Jury Instruction
 MIxed	MotIve	InstructIon	wIthout	the	“second	Prong”
Plaintiff bases his lawsuit on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, a law that makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against an employee on the basis of national 
origin. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his national origin was 
a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision not to offer him 
a promotion. A motivating factor is something that contrib-
uted to Defendant’s decision. 
If you find that Plaintiff has proved that his national 
origin contributed to Defendant’s decision not to offer him 
a promotion, you must enter a verdict for the Plaintiff, even 
if you believe that there were other motivating factors that 
would have caused the Defendant not to offer him a promo-
tion even in the absence of any discriminatory motivation. 
Special Verdict Sheet without the Second Question
1. Did plaintiff establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that his national origin was a motivating factor in the deci-
sion by defendant not to offer him a promotion in Decem-
ber 2003? 
Yes ____ No ____
If you answered “yes” to Question 1, plaintiff is entitled 
to recover back pay damages. The parties have stipulated 
that the total amount of back pay to be awarded to plaintiff 
is $50,000. Check the box below to signify that the plaintiff 
is entitled to damages of $50,000 and then sign the special 
verdict form. 
What Does this All Mean for employers?
Although courts are still divided on whether the pretext 
jury instruction is dead, it is clear that after Costa, more 
and more cases will receive mixed motive instructions. 
Consequently, employers need to know how to deal with 
this situation. Beyond that, we must examine whether the 
judge’s instructions to the jury matter or whether certain 
language in the instructions has led to cases being settled 
for an amount greater than might otherwise occur. Then 
there’s the question we raised at the beginning of this 
report, of whether employers should forget litigation and 
settle all mixed motive cases. If not, should employers use 
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the Baumgarten rule and eliminate the second prong? 
None of these issues can be resolved definitively, due  
to the pervasive problems associated with trying to use 
testing techniques common in social science to answer 
legal questions, as well as certain problems that are specific 
to the matter of jury instructions. Whenever legal scholars 
seek to answer questions using research methods from 
social science they battle a number of issues. First, not 
all cases are reported and those that are reported do not 
reflect a random sample. Second, even if all cases were re-
ported there is still a problem when trying to draw specific 
conclusions from different cases with different sets of facts 
and different issues of law.
The issues we discussed here face even more problems 
than those related to sampling and idiosyncrasy. First, 
most settlements are confidential, making it essentially  
impossible to measure the effect of Costa on settlement 
size. Second, while a large number of discrimination  
opinions are published, the results of jury trials are not  
the issues that make it into the court reports. Instead, 
most of the reported cases feature the judges’ opinions on 
summary judgment motions (which occur before the case 
goes to a jury) and appeals. The appeals cases are only 
relevant if the type of jury instruction is the issue being 
examined (a small percentage of appeals). Finally, looking 
at the results of jury trials is not helpful because the jury 
instructions are often not available so it is often impossible 
to know whether the case was a mixed motive case.
experimental testing Methodology
Since no data are available to answer the questions we 
have sought to address here, we conducted an experiment. 
Like many large law firms, Proskauer occasionally tests a 
case on a mock jury before the case goes to trial. Because 
of the cost of a full mock trial, however, Baumgarten and 
his team of lawyers sometimes test their case by having 
the mock jury hear a statement of the case only, rather 
than mock testimony or other evidence. Proskauer refers 
to these statements, which are combinations of an opening 
statement and closing argument, as “clopenings.” Armed 
with the clopenings from the plaintiff and the defense on a 
sample case, we were able to conduct our experiment. 
First, Proskauer videotaped two of its lawyers  
delivering the clopenings. Next, Proskauer videotaped 
Baumgarten delivering the following three different jury 
exhibit 1
Mixed Motive (MM) versus Pretext (P) Decisions
  
Not promoted because of 
national origin or national   __________ GROUP _________
origin not a motivating factor MM P Total 
No Count 42 57 99
Expected Count 52.3 46.8 99.0
Yes Count 34 11 45
Expected Count 23.8 21.3 45.0
Total Count 76 68 144
Expected Count 76.0 68.0 144.0
 
 
Value
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 13.626* .01
w/ Continuity Correction* 12.329 .01
Likelihood Ratio 14.167 .01
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.531 .01
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are computed only for 
a 2x2 table; N of  valid cases = 144.
exhibit 1A
Mixed Motive with Affirm Defense (MM w/AD)  
versus Pretext (P) Decisions
 
Not promoted because    __________ GROUP _________  
of national origin MM w AD P Total 
No Count 70 57 127
Expected Count 67.0 60.0 127.0
Yes Count 6 11 17
Expected Count 9.0 8.0 17.0
Total Count 76 68 144
Expected Count 76.0 68.0 144.0
 
Value
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 2.364* .124
w/ Continuity Correction* 1.636 .201
Likelihood Ratio 2.381 .123
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.348 .125
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are computed only for 
a 2x2 table; N of  valid cases = 144.
* Our example involves national origin, but it could be any of  the other six   
   protected classes: namely, sex, race color, religion, age, or disability.
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instructions: (1) pretext instructions; (2) the two-prong 
mixed motive instruction, with the affirmative defense; 
and (3) the single-prong mixed motive instruction,  
without the affirmative defense. Armed with the tapes, 
we had to then find potential jurors. Unfortunately, the 
same people who will happily watch a Law and Order 
marathon are reluctant to take part in a law-related study. 
Thus, we asked students attending Cornell University to 
be our mock court jurors.
study Design
We designed our controlled study as follows. On three 
separate nights, we had between 50 and 100 students 
sit in a particular auditorium and watch the clopenings, 
for a total of 219 students. We then 
randomly assigned each student to one 
of three roughly equal groups, each of 
which heard one of the test jury instruc-
tions. One group of 76 students was 
labeled MM, for mixed motive (the full, 
two-prong test); a second group of 75 
students was called MMWO, for mixed 
motive without the affirmative defense 
(the single-prong idea); and the third, 
comprising 68 participants, was group P, 
for pretext. After hearing the jury instruc-
tions, each student received and filled 
out the designated jury verdict sheet. 
Like actual jurors, the MM students did 
not know that if they answered yes to 
question one and yes to question two they were awarding 
costs and fees. Again like actual juries, the MMWO and 
the P students, on the other hand, knew that they were 
awarding all or nothing based on their answer to the one 
question on their verdict sheet.
The results were remarkable. Before we discuss those 
results, however, we must add the caveat that we make no 
claim that our sample is representative of the juror pool 
at large. First, our pool of 18- to 22-year-olds is substan-
tially younger than normal jury pools. Second, we like to 
believe Cornell students are well above average in terms 
of intelligence and education. Finally, most participants 
were students at the Cornell University School of Hotel 
Administration, who would undoubtedly be biased toward 
management when it comes to employment disputes. Even 
acknowledging these problems, we believe that the experi-
ment has merit. While our 219 students may not be repre-
sentative of typical pool, they are, in fact, potential jurors.
study results
Despite the fact that our sample is clearly skewed in the 
ways we just described, we found that jury instructions 
strongly influenced the outcome for our particular sample. 
The raw numbers show that a disparity did seem to ex-
ist between the findings of the different groups. Jurors 
found for the plaintiff and awarded damages in 22 of the 
MMWO cases (29%) and 11 of the pretext (P) cases 
(16%). The mixed motive instruction is more complicated, 
as the two prongs can lead to the following three different 
results: (1) no damages; (2) costs and 
attorneys’ fees; or (3) full damages. This 
group of students awarded either costs 
and fees or full damages in 34 of the MM 
cases (45%); that is, they awarded only 
costs and fees in 28 of the cases (37%), 
and full damages in six of the cases (8%). 
A quick look at these raw numbers leads 
one to believe that employers are better 
off with a pretext instruction than either 
of the mixed motive instructions and, 
depending on the amount of damages 
and costs and fees, better off with the 
single-prong mixed motive instruction 
(MMWO). These raw numbers are 
not, however, indicative of statistical 
significance and it is possible that the differences are just 
a matter of chance. To get a full and clear picture of the 
connection between jury instructions and the awarding of 
damages we conducted a statistical analysis of the data by 
analyzing each set of decisions against each other.
Mixed Motive versus Pretext Decisions
We began by testing whether there are differences in 
the jury’s decision when we compare the first prong of 
the mixed motive (MM1) against the one-prong pretext 
instruction (P). Specifically, we wanted to learn whether 
the number of mixed motive jurors (34) who found that 
national origin did motivate the employer was significantly 
different than the number of pretext jurors (11) who 
found that the employer was liable. As can be seen from 
We conducted  
a statistical  
analysis of the  
data by analyzing 
each set of  
decisions against 
each other.
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the results in Exhibit 1 this differential was highly signifi-
cant, at the 99-percent level of confidence.15 In other words 
whether the mock jury was given a pretext instruction or 
mixed motive instruction produced a significant difference 
across the groups as to the finding of the first prong of the 
mixed motive instruction versus the pretext instruction. 
Next, we compared the entire mixed motive in-
struction—comprising both prong one and prong two 
(MM2)—against the pretext instruction. Specifically, we 
wanted to find whether there was a significant difference 
between the six (of the 76) mixed motive jurors who found 
that the employer would have acted in the same manner 
regardless of national origin versus the 11 (out of 68) 
pretext jurors who found for the company. Using the same 
statistical tests, we found no significance between the full 
mixed motive finding and the pretext finding. Thus, before 
the law changed in 1991 we could argue that whether the 
judge used a pretext instruction or a mixed motive instruc-
tion was irrelevant. The change in the law, however, means 
that while the ultimate finding is insignificant, the costs 
and fees component (prong one) is significant.
Mixed Motive Without (MMWO)  
versus Pretext Decisions (P)
The next question we examined was whether the results of 
a pretext (P) instruction question differed from the results 
of the mixed motive instruction without the second prong 
(MMWO). The raw numbers were as follows: 11 of the 
jurors (16%) found for the plaintiff in the P cases, and 22 
of the jurors (29%) found for the plaintiff the MMWO 
cases. The results of this analysis are seen in Exhibit 2. 
As in the last comparison we estimated both the pair-
wise comparison chi-square tests and the likelihood ratio 
and linear-by-linear test to determine the pair-wise and 
individual group differences. The results show that this 
differential was found to be marginally significant. Spe-
cifically, we found the difference between the MMWO 
and P group to be significant at the 90-percent level of 
confidence. This means that it is unlikely that this dif-
ferential is due to chance, although an outcome by mere 
chance is possible. Thus, employers faced with a mixed 
motive instruction and who choose not to have the second 
prong will, all other things being equal, likely have a more 
difficult time prevailing under this instruction than they 
would under the pretext instruction. 
exhibit 2
Mixed Motive Without (MMWO)  
versus Pretext (P) Decisions
 
Not promoted because 
of national origin  
or national origin    __________ GROUP _________
not a motivating factor MMWO P Total
No Count 53 57 110
Expected Count 57.7 52.3 110.0
Yes Count 22 11 33
Expected Count 17.3 15.7 33.0
Total Count 75 68 143
Expected Count 75.0 68.0 143.0
 
Value
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 3.478* .062
w/ Continuity Correction* 2.776 .096
Likelihood Ratio 3.540 .060
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.453 .063
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are computed only for 
a 2x2 table; N of  valid cases = 143
exhibit 3
Mixed Motive (MM) versus Mixed Motive  
Without (MMWO) Decisions
  
Prong-one question is 
the only decision for    __________ GROUP _________  
both MM and MMWO MM MMWO Total
No Count 42 53 95
Expected Count 47.8 47.2 95.0
Yes Count 34 22 56
Expected Count 28.2 27.8 56.0
Total Count 76 75 151
Expected Count 76.0 75.0 151.0
 
 
Value
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 13.626* .050
w/ Continuity Correction* 3.207 .073
Likelihood Ratio 3.861 .049
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.813 .051
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are computed only for 
a 2x2 table; N of  valid cases = 151; No cells have an expected count less 
than 5; the minimum expected count is 27.81.
* Our example involves national origin, but it could be any of  the other six   
   protected classes: namely, sex, race color, religion, age, or disability.
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Mixed Motive (MM) versus  
Mixed Motive Without (MMWO)
We also looked at how jurors answered the prong-one 
question in the two different instructions. Remember, 
question one is same in both instructions. The only  
difference is that the MM group faces a second ques-
tion that is thought to affect the outcome. Here we are 
assessing the likelihood of a different decision for the 
two groups simply because the MM group has an option 
created by the existence of the prong-two question that 
the MMWO group never sees. MM jurors answered yes 
(discrimination motivated the employer) in 44 percent of 
the cases, while MMWO answered yes in 29 percent of 
the cases. As in the last comparison we estimated both the 
pair-wise comparison chi-square tests and the likelihood 
ratio and linear-by-linear test to determine the pair-wise 
and individual group differences. As can be seen from the 
results in Exhibit 3, this differential was also found to 
be marginally significant. Thus, the MM1 and MMWO 
groups made different decisions with a 90-percent level  
of confidence. Based on this finding, employers who are 
faced with low back pay, but high costs and fees should 
definitely think about limiting the mixed motive instruc-
tion to one prong, as suggested by author Baumgarten. 
The final question we looked at is whether the 
MMWO jurors will provide a different final result than 
the MM jurors once the MM jurors hear both prongs. 
Based on the earlier data discussion we know that for full 
liability MMWO found for the plaintiff in 29 percent of 
the cases and MM2 jurors found for the plaintiff in seven 
percent of the cases. Once again using the statistical tests, 
as shown in Exhibit 4, this difference was found to be 
highly significant. These results now provide a clear indica-
tion that the presence of the second prong in the jury’s 
instruction will produce significantly different decisions, 
compared to an instruction that offers only prong one. The 
inclusion of the second prong in the jury instructions will 
likely have a significant and positive impact on the decision 
from the employer’s perspective. Based on this finding, 
employers faced with a large amount of back pay should 
include the second prong of the mixed motive instruction. 
conclusion 
Our results point strongly to the principle that the  
legal theories contained in jury instructions matter.  
Assuming facts that could go either way, employers have 
a substantially equal chance of prevailing in pretext and 
mixed motive cases, but there is significant chance that a 
mixed motive instruction will result in cost and fees being 
awarded. Employers therefore are better off with a pretext 
instruction than a mixed motive instruction. If, however, 
the judge orders a mixed motive instruction, the employer 
has a difficult choice. The MMWO instruction will more 
likely yield a complete victory for the plaintiff than will 
the MM. On the other hand, the chance of the full mixed 
motive instruction resulting in an award of costs and fees 
is greater than the likelihood of the one-prong mixed mo-
tive instruction, resulting in a complete plaintiff victory. 
The question that arises is whether the employer should 
offer the second-prong defense if the judge orders a mixed 
motive instruction. We believe that the answer depends on 
the case. If the case is a “fees case” (low liability, but high 
attorneys’ fees),16 the employer should go with the one-
prong MMWO. If liability is high, the employer should 
stick with the full two-prong mixed motive. Both of these 
options, however, are worse than pretext instruction.
exhibit 4
Mixed Motive (MM) versus Mixed Motive  
Without (MMWO) Decisions
  
Prong-one decision on both and  __________ GROUP _________  
prong-two decision for MM only MM MMWO Total
No Count 70 53 123
Expected Count 61.9 61.1 123.0
Yes Count 6 22 28
Expected Count 14.1 13.9 28.0
Total Count 76 75 151
Expected Count 76.0 75.0 151.0
 
Value
Asymp.Sig. 
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square* 11.486* .01
w/ Continuity Correction* 10.111 .01
Likelihood Ratio 12.070 .01
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.410 .01
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square and continuity correction are computed only for 
a 2x2 table; N of  valid cases = 151.
* Our example involves national origin, but it could be any of  the other six   
   protected classes: namely, sex, race color, religion, age, or disability.
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The CRA of 1991 made the mixed motive instruction 
much more detrimental to employers. Costa made the 
mixed motive instruction much easier to obtain. As plain-
tiffs’ lawyers become more familiar with the mixed motive 
instruction they will request it more often. Employers 
should argue against that approach, but if the judge orders 
it, employers then need to assess the true costs of their 
case. If it is a fees case our study suggest employer should 
use the MMWO. In a case where the potential for sub-
stantial back pay is high employers should present the full 
two-prong mixed motive defense. 
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1 Desert Palace d/b/a Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 
(2003).
2 In contrast, Simpson was found liable for wrongful death in a civil case 
where the standard was preponderance of the evidence.
3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
4 Texas Department of  Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
5 Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
6 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
7 In many ways Hicks makes sense, because employer should be found guilty 
of discrimination only when the factfinders believe that the employer 
actually discriminated against the employee. Title VII is not a truth-in-
employment act, and there are times when employers, despite their best 
efforts, may not know why a decision was made. 
8 See: Samuel Estreicher, “Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate 
over Pre-dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements,” 16 Ohio St. J. on 
Disp. Resol., 559 (2001).
9 Id.
10 In contrast, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 
always allowed for jury trials.
11 Subsequent to the 1991 Act, Congress passed the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, which also allowed for jury trials.
12 David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, and Zev J. Eigen, “In Defense of Mandatory 
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath 
Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process,” 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. 
L. 73.
13 Id.
14 Supra.
15 We first ran a Pearson Chi-square test (with and without a continuity cor-
rection) to determine whether there are differences in the attribution of 
motivation across the two instruction sets. We then ran both likelihood 
ratio and linear-by-linear association tests to determine whether this dif-
ference was statistically significant.
16 Sometimes back pay is marginal because the employee found another job, 
but the litigation costs may be hundreds of thousands of dollars. Other 
times, both the back pay and the fees are high. It is rare for a case to 
involve high back pay and low fees. 
Sometimes I feel discriminated against, but it does not  
make me angry. It merely astonishes me. How can any deny 
themselves the pleasure of my company? It’s beyond me.
—Zora neale hurston (1903–1960), american folklorist and Writer
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